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 Singapore has most of the trappings of democracy—parliamentary system of 
government with, additionally, an elected president; regular, free and accurately 
counted elections, and universal suffrage. However, certain draconian laws, 
controls on political participation, and measures limiting civil and political 
rights and freedom of the press, mean that Singapore is, to some extent – critics 
vary on the degree—an authoritarian state (Mauzy & Milne, 2002: 128). 
CONTEXTUALIZING SINGAPORE  
Since independence from British rule in 1965, the political system in Singapore has been shaped 
by the rule of Senior Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his close associates in the People’s 
Action Party (PAP). Convinced that a purely Western model of democracy would lead to ethnic 
conflict and social unrest in Singapore’s multicultural society, the government has consistently 
maintained that only a strong and united government can provide the leadership and policies to 
secure progress and prosperity in the city-state (Vasil 2004). In addition, the ruling PAP claims 
that Singapore’s racial and religious diversity make it necessary to limit the democratic rights 
and freedoms of Singaporeans—especially during elections, when there is heightened political 
activity and emotion (Singh 1992; Vasil 2004).  
While the fear of ethnic conflict has been used as an argument to limit the role of democracy in 
Singapore, it is important to realize that elections in Singapore are not held to determine who is 
to rule the country, but “to bring together in the institution a body consisting of the most gifted, 
innovative, well-educated and experienced men and women, who can offer Singapore a good, 
achievement-oriented and effective government” (Vasil 2004: 110). It is also a mechanism for 
the government to ensure that “irresponsible populist demagogues and adversarial politicians 
who have little compunction in inciting racial and religious hatred, confrontation and conflict 
for political gains are kept out of parliament as far as possible” (Vasil 2004: 110). Thus, unlike 
in liberal democracies, elections in Singapore are not a contest of alternative policies and 
programs offered by competing political parties, a view underscored by Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew when he declared that: 
There just is no viable alternative program for an island city state other than 
what we have empirically worked out in the last 30 years. That is why the able 
and the talented have not come forward to form a credible alternative team and 
challenge the PAP. They know PAP is doing the right thing. They are content to 
thrive and prosper with the present men in charge (cited in Vasil 2004: 110). 
  1Singapore’s economic and social achievements have given the PAP a high level of credibility 
and legitimacy, and it is no surprise that a large majority of Singaporeans have come to accept 
the PAP’s right to act as custodian of the nation. As a result, while most Singaporeans wish for a 
stronger opposition in the parliament, few of them have genuinely pushed for an alternative 
government (Vasil 2004; Singh 1992). Hence all opposition parties since independence have 
been extremely weak and fragmented, and consequently, attracted limited public support (Vasil 
2004). PAP’s efforts to portray opposition parties as deflections of national development and 
progress have also helped to diminish public support (Singh, 1992). In fact, many Singaporeans 
have been led to believe that opposition leaders are irresponsible opportunists, or lightweights 
with flawed characters, who lack the credibility and skills to manage a modern Singapore (Vasil 
2004; da Cunha 1997). Such tactics, of course, have come under fire from opinion leaders and 
representatives from opposition parties who blame the ruling party for their failure to be 
seriously considered by the electorate. They maintain that the PAP government’s brand of 
authoritarianism has made it impossible for them to function politically because of repressive 
policies and restrictions it imposes on them and on the media (Vasil 2004; Singh 1992).  
In their extensive study on Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party, Mauzy and 
Milne (2002) identify a range of “draconian laws” and restrictions that determine Singapore’s 
status as an authoritarian state. Laws such as the infamous Internal Security Act, instituted 
during British rule to counter Communist insurgents and used by the PAP to detain political 
opponents, and the Societies Act of 1967 (amended in 1988), which requires most organizations 
of more than ten people to be registered, are commonly cited by Singapore observers as 
authoritarian and politically motivated. In addition, many believe that Singapore’s judicial 
system is politically compliant, despite its high international ratings for efficiency, innovation 
and fairness. However, very few, if any, would publicly articulate such sentiments for fear of 
being arraigned on charges of libel or defamation. 
The PAP government’s inherent hostility towards opposition parties is illustrated by their strict 
control of all forms of mass media, which has enabled them to execute effective propaganda 
against its political opponents (Gomez 2000; Singh 1992). Moreover, the PAP’s monopolistic 
control has not only resulted in direct censorship but subsequently created a culture of self-
censorship among media practitioners who, in their role as gatekeepers of information to the 
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For example, political parties are finding it difficult to secure advertisements for their 
publications from would-be advertisers. Most potential sponsors fear that their business would 
suffer if they took out an advertisement in an opposition newspaper or even expose their 
sympathy to the opposition cause (Gomez 2001).  
While Singapore’s political and legal structures are worthy of further research, this chapter 
focuses on another aspect of Singapore’s authoritarianism: the political control of the media. We 
seek to identify the tactics and strategies employed by the Singapore government to manage the 
media’s ability to engage in political communication, which McNair (1995: 4) describes as 
“purposeful communication about politics.” With this broad and inclusive definition of political 
communication, which effectively links the study of the media with politics, the section that 
follows will provide a summary of recent research on political communication research in 
Singapore and will consider why there is a perpetual dearth of critical studies on this subject. 
The chapter will then look at the mechanisms of media control in Singapore, beginning with 
traditional media and followed by digital media control. 
RESEARCH ON POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
In a recent issue of the Asian Journal of Communication (September 2004), Singapore-based 
academic Randolph Kluver observed that: 
[T]he paucity of literature on Asian experiences and frameworks means that most 
of the theory-building that happens within the field of political communication is 
derivative from the Western experience, which presumes that the Western model 
of politics and communication is or should be normative for the rest of the world. 
This lack of critical engagement with other global perspectives establishes a de 
facto situation in which only Western theories, Western experiences, and Western 
contexts are used to generate analysis (Kluver 2004: 118). 
While Kluver’s advice about the need for non-Western perspectives is worth considering, its 
application is problematic in the case of Singapore because, as in all aspects of everyday life in 
Singapore, the media have been turned into ‘depoliticised’ entities (Mauzy & Milne 2002). In 
other words, the media’s role is primarily to inform, educate and entertain Singaporeans for the 
purposes of communitarian nation building, while staying more or less clear from sensitive 
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is a direct result of Lee Kuan Yew’s disdain for the Western model of the media as the ‘Fourth 
Estate.’ As Lee himself made clear in 1971, “politics are only for professional politicians, and no 
person or group of persons, organizations or associations may comment on national policies 
without first joining or forming a political party” (cited in Seow 1998: 27). The government, 
with the relatively recent addition of the elected presidency in Singapore, thus becomes the only 
institution in Singapore that is ‘permitted’ to embody democratic expressions (George 2002). 
Within the framework of political communication studies, Singapore’s media are positioned as a 
neutral and moral information-bearer to and for the Singaporean public (Birch 1993). 
Consequently, political communication in Singapore should be nothing more than official 
government communication to the public on its own prescribed terms (Maarek 2003). This 
position is, of course, naïve and ignores the fact that there are, and will always be, resistances, 
oppositions and alternatives to the status quo. Before investigating recent alternatives, we turn 
our attention to recent research on political communication in Singapore. 
The rejection of the democratic role of the media in Singapore has severe implications for 
academic research on political communication. In his review of communication research in 
Singapore, Kuo (1991) notes that “communication research in Singapore has been carried out by 
researchers from various academic backgrounds without the support of a strong institutional 
base, and without an established research tradition” (p. 120). This in turn has led to a dominance 
of descriptive rather than theoretical or critical studies that are typically conducted on ad hoc 
bases. Kuo concludes that “communication research in Singapore is lagging both in quality and 
quantity” (p. 121). In addition, it is likely that political communication research has been 
suppressed by Singapore’s tight social and political controls, and the fact that the parameters for 
acceptable political debates (known in Singapore as ‘out-of-bounds markers’) are shrouded in 
ambiguity. Thus, it is no surprise that very few academics dare to test the boundaries of political 
deliberation in Singapore (Lee 2005). 
One of the first critical studies of political communication in Singapore is David Birch’s (1993) 
seminal monograph Singapore Media: Communication Strategies and Practices, which 
identified Singapore’s media strategies and policies as a “measured ideological framework of a 
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years, Singapore’s communication policies were discussed more often with reference to a 
particular policy issue pertaining to a specific medium—particularly the press (George 2002; 
Rodan 2000) and the Internet (Gomez 2002; Lee, T. 2002; 2003; 2005; Sussman 2003). These 
studies concentrate on particular aspects of media regulation, such as censorship (Yeo & 
Mahizhnan 1998; Gomez 2000), ownership and political control (Rodan 2000; 2004), and the 
state of Singapore’s civil society as reflected in the media (George & Pillay 1998; Rodan 2000; 
2004; Lee forthcoming). 
The official adoption of the development press model by the Singapore government allowed a 
select group of media researchers to conduct a number of carefully phrased studies focusing on 
press performance. Based on a content analysis of letters to the editor in the national newspaper 
The Straits Times, Ramaprasad and Ong (1990) conclude that ‘the salience of the national 
development themes seems to have been successfully transferred by government into the minds 
of the people and publishers’ (p. 53). The study points out, however, that in contrast to the 
demands of the traditional Development Press model, some of the letters, although focusing on 
development issues, were rather critical in tone. Indeed, the letters to the editor in the Straits 
Times have since become the de facto site for public feedback and limited political discussion in 
Singapore (Lee 2005). 
Similarly, Choi’s (1999) content analysis of news coverage of juvenile delinquency examines 
how Singapore’s newspapers were able to play a nation-building role while maintaining their 
individuality throughout the 1990s. The study concludes that the “Singapore press plays a nation-
building role by propagating public campaigns initiated and managed by the government.” 
Especially the leading Chinese newspaper, so Choi, emphasized the government policies, while 
other newspapers simply covered cases and events of juvenile delinquency or remained neutral. 
The first truly empirical ‘media and election’ study conducted in Singapore is Kuo, Holaday, and 
Peck’s (1993) analysis of the role the media played during the 1991 General Election. The study, 
which is based on a quota sample of 435 Singapore residents, found that the electorate relied 
heavily on the mass media for information about the election but perceived the election coverage 
to have low credibility and to be skewed heavily toward the ruling party. The authors showed, 
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the PAP, while only 34.5% were about any of the opposition parties. Moreover, PAP stories 
were usually produced with edited footage and soundbites that contained prerecorded 
soundtracks spoken by journalist describing the event, while news stories concerning opposition 
parties were much simpler, such as those of the news anchor speaking without visual illustration 
or with a single continuous shot of the candidate concerned. Likewise, the PAP appears to be the 
party with the greatest number of items in the newspapers with 34.7% of election-related articles 
reported, as compared to the 16.9% about opposition parties..  
Similarly, Hao’s (1996) analysis of data obtained in a telephone poll of 570 randomly selected 
Singapore residents found that although people in Singapore are basically satisfied with the 
overall performance of the local press, they also question its credibility, especially with regard to 
news coverage on domestic politics and government affairs (see also Tan 1990). Hao warns that 
an increasingly younger, better educated, and critical public would eventually begin to question 
the fundamental credibility of Singapore’s press. 
In recent years, a growing number of studies focusing on public opinion in Singapore have been 
published. Chang (1999), for example, examines the form and content of public opinion 
reporting in Singapore’s news media to determine their social implications for public policy 
decision making. The findings show that “public opinion surveys in Singapore are fraught with 
theoretical and methodological problems and that their reporting in the news media leaves much 
to be desired” (Chang 1999: 11). The author pointedly concludes that the frequent but 
incompetent reporting of polls in Singapore’s media might lead to the illusion of a responsive 
government and political complacency in the public. 
Gunther and Ang’s (1996) analysis of the third-person effect hypothesis examines public opinion 
about television censorship in Singapore. Data for this study come from face-to-face interviews 
with 506 randomly selected Singaporeans who evaluated 10 categories of “sensitive” television 
content. The authors not only found a substantial perceptual bias in all content categories (people 
feeling that “sensitive” television content influenced others more negatively than themselves), 
but also strong opinions favoring censorship of television content. According to the authors, the 
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media in part because of a tendency to overestimate its negative influence. 
A study by Willnat, Lee, and Detenber (2002) provides partial support for the spiral of silence 
hypothesis in Singapore. Based on a representative telephone poll of 668 Singaporeans, the study 
tests the assumption that political outspokenness is largely a function of people’s perception of 
the dominant opinion climate, their perceived importance of critical issues, and other 
psychological predispositions. As predicted, the findings indicate that respondents who perceived 
a trend in public opinion against their own beliefs and who considered the tested issues important 
were less likely to express their opinions on these issues in public. The study also shows that 
political outspokenness in Singapore is associated with respondents’ self-concept of 
interdependence, fear of social isolation, and general communication apprehension. 
Overall, the here discussed political communication studies clearly suggest that the media in 
Singapore is tightly managed and controlled. Various reasons have been cited—both officially 
and unofficially—for placing the media on a tight leash, but they generally point to the desire 
and the professed need by the PAP government to maintain power for the good of the nation. As 
Birch (1993) concludes in his landmark study of the Singapore media: 
This is a legitimating strategy for keeping the PAP in power: it requires a 
compliant media to stage the myths, generated by government, in order to 
manipulate and control social consciousness. All societies and cultures do this to 
some extent. What makes Singapore different from most is that it admits to what 
it is doing, and legitimates it within a postcolonial discourse of nation-building (p. 
74). 
The next section expands on this trajectory of thought by considering how such a mode of what 
McNair (1995) refers to as ‘media management’ is conducted in Singapore.  
Singapore’s Mediascape: Management and Control  
Arjun Appadurai (1996) famously coined the term ‘mediascape’ as one of five dimensional 
‘scapes’ intended to explicate differences and disjuncture in the global cultural economy. 
According to Appadurai (1996: 35), the term refers to the production and dissemination of 
mediated information via traditional and electronic means to form political and ideological 
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management and control of the mass media are intended to keep the PAP government in absolute 
power. According to McNair (1995: 135), this mode of political communication can be 
understood as ‘media management’, where governments seek to “control, manipulate or 
influence media organizations in ways which correspond to their political objectives.” This 
section provides an abbreviated background of Singapore’s media and suggests how the exercise 
of media management in Singapore has been largely successful due to a combination of 
regulatory instruments as well as more subtle strategies like co-optation and auto-regulation (Lee 
2002; 2005; Rodan 2002; 2004). 
The mediascape in Singapore can be divided into three broad categories: broadcast media, print 
media and the Internet (which will be looked at in greater detail in the next section of the 
chapter). All three categories are required to serve as handmaidens to the nation’s economic 
development effort. Until 1980, the government ran all television and radio stations under the 
charge of a government department, Radio and Television Singapore. This department was then 
turned into a statutory body, the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, through an Act of 
Parliament before it was corporatized to become Singapore International Media (SIM) in 1994 
(Ang 2000). Although no longer a statutory board, SIM is a private company wholly owned by 
the government through its state investment agency Temasek Holdings. As part of the process of 
gearing-up for prospective competition in the domestic and global media industries, SIM was 
subsequently restructured and renamed as the Media Corporation of Singapore (MediaCorp). 
At first glance, Singapore appears to house a thriving local print media environment—with 
strong circulation numbers for its main English and Chinese language newspapers and relatively 
vibrant Malay and Tamil language newspapers despite its small readership base—that exists 
alongside wide access to international news and titles (Bokhorst-Heng 2002). However, a pattern 
of mergers and (politically motivated) closures of various newspaper companies which began in 
the mid-1980s have resulted not only in fewer mainstream newspapers (as compared to the 1970s 
and 1980s), but also in the formation of the Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), essentially a 
government-linked print media monopoly. As Bokhorst-Heng (2002: 564) notes, ‘With all 
English, Chinese, Malay, and since early 1996, Tamil, newspapers under one SPH umbrella, the 
mergers created a virtual controlled newspaper monopoly.’ 
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reduction in alternative voices and venues as home news about Singaporean political affairs 
became ‘centralized’ and ‘mainstreamed.’ In an article which proposes an interesting delineation 
of the media in Singapore as either ‘mainstream’ or ‘marginal,’ former Straits Times journalist 
Cherian George (2002: 175) describes the prevailing press system in Singapore as one that 
facilitates “the government’s freedom from the press” as opposed to the liberal democratic model 
of freedom of the press from government. The government is able to achieve this ‘ideal’ situation 
of not having real political opponents partly via a panoply of legal and regulatory controls. These 
include, among other things, licenses to publish newspapers, the aforementioned Internal 
Security Act, and the Official Secrets Act, which deters journalists from being on the receiving 
end of political leaks. As George (2002) details with cogency, not only are these laws designed 
to protect the political establishment, they have actually been invoked between 1970s and the 
1990s to bring local editors and journalists to task. Journalists and news editors in Singapore are 
therefore mindful of the inherent risks of their trade as they go about their daily practice. 
The key legislation governing the print media is the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act 
(NPPA). Enacted in 1974, and amended several times thereafter to tighten its juridical reach, the 
NPPA empowers the government to determine the composition of a newspaper company’s board 
of directors. With the NPPA’s structure and mechanism in place, George (2002: 177) argues that 
“the government needs neither to post its officials directly into top newsroom positions, not to 
nationalize the press.” Instead, the control of the press is much more subtle as it relies on a 
combination of political co-optation and auto-regulation, both of which have been tried and 
tested, and found to work very effectively in Singapore (Rodan 1996; Lee 2005). While the 
former aims to win over formidable and outspoken critics by roping them into the ‘inner circle’ 
of political management, the latter seeks to regulate and police criticisms by ensuring that they 
are articulated via government-mediated channels or are preemptively quashed even before they 
are raised (Rodan 1996; Lee 2005). In the case of the press, George (2002) reveals that: 
Contrary to folklore, the newsroom does not receive daily instructions about what 
to publish, and sensitive articles are not submitted to government officials for 
vetting. Like all major newsmakers, government officials try to influence 
coverage of their particular portfolios through a mix of persuasive tactics, from 
offering the inducement of greater access to dangling the veiled threat of legal 
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independently come to the right conclusions—even if they occasionally do not – 
than to replace them with mere functionaries. As members of the establishment, 
newspaper editors are expected to have an instinctive grasp of Singapore’s 
national interests and how to protect them (p. 177-178; emphasis in original). 
While the invocation of ‘national interest’ as a reason for clamping down on alternative voices is 
a common strategy for contemporary media management and control, Singapore’s approach is 
extremely ingenious as it utilizes a potent combination of legislative and auto-regulatory 
mechanisms. This ideology of control has been the key driver of media control and policy since 
the nation’s independence in 1965.  
Singaporean gatekeepers have long been wary—even paranoid—of foreign media and 
international broadcasters engaging in Singapore’s domestic politics. Media censorship laws, 
particularly those relating to foreign publications and screen products, were enacted and quite 
regularly amended to control the inflow of negative foreign social, cultural and political 
influences (Seow 1998). In July 1986 for example, the NPPA was amended to enable to 
government to restrict sales of foreign publications deemed to be interfering with domestic 
politics (George 2002). Following the passage of this law, many foreign media were taken to 
task for their reports of unsavory aspects of the PAP system (Chee 2001). Foreign publications 
falling victim to this aspect of the law include the Far Eastern Economic Review,  The 
Economist, The Asian Wall Street Journal and Asiaweek (Seow 1998). In addition, over the past 
30 years, global media publications including Newsweek, Reuters, The Times (London), The Star 
(Malaysia), Time, and International Herald Tribune have had their editors and/or journalists 
arraigned on charges of publishing defamatory or libelous articles (Lee 2005). 
The spirit of the NPPA’s systematic muzzling of the foreign media was extended to the global 
broadcast media in April 2001. After a very brief debate in a one-party dominated Parliament, an 
amendment to the Singapore Broadcasting Act (2001) was passed. Under this legislation, foreign 
broadcasters and providers of television news—such as the BBC, CNN and CNBC Asia—which 
are found to meddle in domestic politics could be slapped with restrictions on the number of 
households which can receive their broadcasts through the monopoly cable television provider 
Starhub Cable Vision; or worse, the broadcast channel could be ‘blacked-out’ altogether. If such 
an action is implemented, advertising and/or subscription revenue of the broadcaster in question 
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operating in Singapore enjoy a profitable existence, they have learned to be pragmatic enough to 
avoid commenting or, indeed, communicating about Singapore politics—as well as their 
politicians (Lee 2002). 
Although the introduction of legislations and penalties has seriously eroded both the local and 
global media’s ability to comment freely on Singapore politics, a stable hegemonic state-media 
relationship has since evolved over the years. The local print and broadcast media are best 
described as pro-development and hence pro-government in the name of national security and 
public interest. As such, their role and credibility have been so compromised in the eyes of the 
public, that many locals have come to identify the mass media with the ruling party (Kuo et al. 
1993). Yet, despite a clear lack of political debate occurring in and through the media, Singapore 
harbors the ambition of becoming the ‘global media city’ of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21
st 
century (Leo & Lee 2004). 
In April 2000, Singapore experimented with limited media liberalization when it introduced 
competition between the two core local print (SPH) and broadcast media (MediaCorp) players by 
allowing both companies to cross into cross into each other’s turfs. That year, SPH became a 
two-channel broadcaster while MediaCorp ventured into newspaper publishing. This move to 
liberalize the media was done in part to support Singapore’s ‘creative industries’ and to prepare 
the media sector for global expansion. It was recognized that the economic framework of 
Singapore’s media sector had to shift away from a monopolistic structure—at least in 
appearance—in order for the rest of the world to take its global media city ambitions seriously 
(Leo & Lee 2004). 
However, the plan to inject ‘soft competition’ was a dismal financial failure as well as a public 
relations disaster. In November 2003, both Lee Boon Yang, the incumbent Information and 
Communications Minister, and then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew lamented that media 
liberalization in Singapore had largely failed. Based on the sizeable losses that both players 
sustained over the three-year period since the introduction of competition in April 2000, both 
ministers concluded that a monopolistic set-up was more realistic for Singapore (Lee 2003). 
Although both SPH and MediaCorp dismissed the possibility of a merger, it was publicly 
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Singapore would be rationalized in a move “to stem losses and enhance shareholder value” 
(Chua 2004: 1). Under the so-called ‘merger’ agreement, MediaCorp would regain its monopoly 
on broadcasting under a new entity called MediaCorp TV Holdings, which will be 20% owned 
by SPH. In the newspaper scene, the publication of SPH’s tabloid Streats will continue, but its 
operations will be taken over by MediaCorp Press, which will be 40% owned by SPH and the 
remaining 60% by MediaCorp. Although the current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong dismissed 
suggestions that the government had orchestrated the merger, calling it an “adjustment” to 
market situation (Teo 2004), the pre-ordained outcome was intended to reaffirm the duopolistic 
structure of mainstream media in Singapore. Political communication and journalistic practices 
are therefore “subordinate to a common purpose, of which the government is the ultimate oracle” 
(George 2002: 175). 
This section has made the case that traditional media outlets in Singapore are guided by two 
government-owned or controlled media heavyweights: SPH in the print media and MediaCorp in 
the broadcast media. They exists alongside a wide array of global media publications and 
broadcasts that give the impression that Singapore is a socially, culturally, economically and 
politically open and vibrant society. The reality, however, is that while this model of media 
management has served the PAP government well in restricting or limiting free expression and 
political debates, it has blunted the potential of domestic media organizations to compete beyond 
the confines of Singapore. 
The question that remains is whether political communication has been or can be more 
meaningful on the Internet, especially given that this relatively new medium is widely regarded 
as the most democratic and autonomous space available for political communication (Vedel 
2003). The next section that follows explores this possibility and considers if the Internet has the 
potential to alter Singapore’s political communication landscape. 
THE INTERNET IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION  
In 1992, the Singapore government proclaimed that Singapore would become the ‘intelligent 
island-state’ of the Asia-Pacific region by the year 2000 (Lee 2002). Today, with 99% of 
households and businesses connected to a nationwide broadband network and more than 66% of 
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Britons or Australians (Lee 2002; 2005). With relatively fewer regulatory restraints compared to 
traditional media, the openness of the Internet has enabled individuals and groups to set up Web 
sites and weblogs (or blogs) to publicize their own interests and agendas. This unlegislated shift 
in the media regime has also led to a mushrooming of alternative online media on Singapore 
(George 2002). 
As early as 1994, the online bulletin board soc.culture.singapore surfaced as the first alternative 
Web site dedicated to open discussions on Singapore politics and current affairs. Although 
soc.culture.singapore caused a political stir, it was the Singapore Internet Community 
(Sintercom) Web site, launched in October 1994, which popularized alternative online 
journalism in Singapore. Although somewhat amateurish in its presentation, Sintercom carried a 
wide array of ‘contentious’ journalistic reports, including a summary of ‘hot topics’ extracted 
from the soc.culture.singapore forum that tended to be political in nature, an electronic bulletin 
board to garner feedback from readers, commentaries on national issues, and publication of well-
written letters to the press that had either been rejected or strategically edited by The Straits 
Times (George 2002). Within a short time, Sintercom gained popular appeal and was regarded as 
the “beacon of civil society” in Singapore (Lee forthcoming). Sintercom was radical not only 
because it was the first Internet site aimed at engaging Singaporeans in an alternative fashion, it 
was also the first group to take advantage of the Internet to test political boundaries and 
circumvent both legal and socio-cultural obstacles (George 2002). 
Encouraged by Sintercom’s success in countering PAP’s monopoly of media bandwidth, 
political parties soon sought out the Internet as an alternative communication tool. The 
opposition National Solidarity Party was the first to launch a political party Web site in 1995 
(Seah 2001). In response to this, the PAP developed a so-called “Young PAP Web site” where 
young PAP members were given the opportunity to discuss PAP policies and related issues in a 
web-based discussion board (Gomez 2002). According to the Young PAP (‘Our vision’ 2005), 
the official goal of such a discussion forum is to ‘help the PAP maintain its position as the 
mainstream political party of Singapore, by expressing the aspirations of young Singaporeans, 
and by recruiting supporters, members and leaders for the Party from among young 
Singaporeans.’ It is interesting to note that all major political parties in Singapore launched their 
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that Web sites are relatively unimportant as political campaign tools (Gomez 2002).  
 
Kluver’s (2004) content analysis of political party Web sites during the 2001 Singapore general 
election shows that only four out of 21 political parties in Singapore actually maintained Web 
sites and that “most of them did not make use of features and content explicitly allowed by the 
Parliamentary Elections Act Amendment, such as candidate biographies, frequent updates, 
moderated forums, and multimedia content” (p. 449). Moreover, only a few Web sites offered 
interactive features such as discussion forums, opportunities for active participation and 
volunteering, and e-mail addresses to which voters could send their views and comments. Kluver 
(2004) concludes, “in contrast to a perceived global trend toward the ‘Internet-ization’ of 
politics, the 2001 Singapore general election demonstrated that in spite of an advanced 
technological infrastructure, elections are still won and lost offline” (p. 455). 
The potential use of the Internet for alternative discourse, political communication and 
campaigning, however, was neutralized by a series of legislations and self-regulatory codes 
aimed at controlling or limiting the political use of the Internet. To a large extent, the 
innovativeness of alternative Web sites like Sintercom turned it into a regulatory ‘guinea pig’ as 
the government was able to witness the political threat of an un(der)regulated Internet (Lee 
forthcoming). As early as 1996, the authorities introduced a raft of regulatory guidelines to 
ensure that online ‘prohibited material’—defined as “material that is objectionable on the 
grounds of public interest, public morality, public order, public security, national harmony, or is 
otherwise prohibited by applicable Singapore laws”—were minimized or restricted (Lee 2002: 
11; Sussman 2003: 46). Although such a definition of ‘prohibited material’ clearly leaves room 
for discretionary interpretation and should have been queried by the public, there was barely any 
discussion on the issue in Singapore. Instead, the move that sparked both widespread interest was 
a decision made in 1997 to block 100 pornographic sites via the proxy servers of mass Internet 
service providers in Singapore (Lee 2002; 2003; 2005). To quell public disquiet, the government 
stressed that Singapore was fundamentally ‘technology-friendly’, and that the online censorship 
was a moral gesture and not politically-motivated (Lee forthcoming). 
  14The government’s attempt to exercise political control over Internet content was unmistakable 
when it passed further regulations that required content providers with ‘political messages’ or 
‘political advertising’ to register with the Internet regulator, the Media Development Authority 
(MDA) (formerly the Singapore Broadcasting Authority) (George 2002; Sussman 2003). 
Sintercom managed to sidestep this directive by convincing the authorities that it was not a 
political site, but a civic organization. But in July 2001, notice was issued to Sintercom’s founder 
Tan Chong Kee to register as a site “engaged in the propagation, promotion or discussion of 
political issues relating to Singapore” (Goh 2001). Tan responded by announcing that the 
arbitrariness of regulatory terms, especially in the definition of “political issues,” meant that he 
had no choice but to shut down. He then lamented that civil society in Singapore was a “lost 
cause” (Tan 2001). 
Determined to control online materials, especially those that could spark anti-government 
sentiments, the government passed new anti-electioneering laws prior to the 2001 general 
elections (Tan 2003). As a pre-emptive measure, new communication tools like short messaging 
services over mobile phones were also outlawed (Lee 2002). Political parties, candidates 
standing for election, and non-party political Web sites are required to be registered with the 
MDA, and had to observe the Internet campaigning rules in accordance with the 2001 
Parliamentary Elections Act (PEA) and the 2001 Parliamentary Elections Regulations. While the 
SBA rules set down broad political and moral markers that must be followed at all times, the 
changes made to the Parliamentary Elections Act are narrower in scope. For one, they come into 
effect only during an election—between the time an election is formally announced by a writ and 
the time the polls close. For another, the new rules, while allowing Internet campaigning for the 
first time, also set limits on its form and who can provide it (Tan 2001). 
The PEA states that although private sites are not allowed to support any party or candidate, the 
Web sites of political parties are allowed to post their manifestos, posters, candidate profiles and 
photos, newsletters, event announcements, advertisements to recruit volunteers, political party 
supporters or newsletter subscribers, and to hold online discussions and forums (Singapore 
Elections Department 2001). However, parties must appoint moderators for chatrooms and 
discussion forums during the election and keep logs of all messages (Tsang 2001a). These 
moderators are also to regulate and remove any messages that are deemed to be against public 
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Any other Internet campaigning materials such as transaction services, announcements or notices 
referring to the sale of political merchandise and other fund-raising activities are restricted 
(Singapore Elections Department 2001). The publication of opinion polls during election and 
exit polls during polling day are also forbidden under the bill (Tan 2001). While these 
regulations may seem highly restrictive, the MDA continues to insist that they do not pre-censor 
content of political sites since its sole objective is to ensure that those who run Web sites and 
engage in the discussion of domestic politics will be accountable and responsible for that content 
(Tsang 2001b). This was met with protests by some content managers, owners and editors of 
online forums and Web sites who are now accountable for libelous information posted on heir 
sites—even if such posts were from anonymous contributors (Gomez 2002). As Sussman 
explains, this “wide range of laws proscribing speech is intentionally vague so as to have the 
most chilling effect on political discussion held outside the gates of PAP-controlled channels” 
(2003: 46). 
In addition to the above regulatory measures, the government has also ‘authorized’ the Singapore 
police and other state agencies to conduct regular checks on ISP accounts of public users. Since 
1994, the year the Internet was introduced to the Singaporean public, several reports of police 
conducting mass scanning of subscribers’ emails and Internet accounts have appeared in The 
Straits Times (Lee 2002). Although official explanations for these clandestine activities typically 
pertain to law enforcement and technical or systems security, the fear that Internet ‘snooping’ 
and general surveillance are common in Singapore makes it necessary for all Singaporeans, 
including journalists and civil society activists, to toe the official line by self-regulating and self-
censoring (Gomez 2000). The result is that any online space that can be used for democratic 
political communication in Singapore has been ‘nipped in the bud’ by the government. 
The government further demonstrated its control capabilities and regulatory reach in the new 
media environment by tackling an online publication in 2002—the same way it has done in the 
past with traditional print media. On August 4, 2002, the international news agency Bloomberg 
published an article by its US-based columnist Patrick Smith that described as nepotism the 
appointment of Ho Ching, the daughter-in-law of former Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and 
wife of current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, as Executive Director of Temasek Holdings, 
  16the powerful government-owned corporation that controls most of the government-linked 
companies in Singapore (Lee 2005). This article was published on Bloomberg’s Web site, and 
appeared in print only in Malaysia’s The New Sunday Times on August 11, 2002. Upon 
knowledge of a possible defamation suit, Bloomberg retracted its article, apologized to the 
Senior Minister, the Prime Minister as well as his Deputy Lee Hsien Loong, and offered 
damages amounting to S$595,000. The apology and compensation were accepted and the case 
was settled promptly in three weeks (Lee 2005). Bloomberg’s quick settlement demonstrates a 
pragmatic understanding of political constraints of both media operations and Internet use in 
Singapore, and that the Singapore government has no intention of relinquishing its control of all 
facets of political communication in the Internet era. 
There is little doubt that regulatory measures, combined with policing actions that could be 
construed as tools for social and political intimidation, have worked to rein in oppositional 
political discourses in the media. Although the Singapore government has a reputation for 
periodically refining media regulations to suit its own political agenda, and thus keep civil 
society and political communication under tight strictures (Rodan 2001), alternative Web sites 
dedicated to critical political engagements continue to appear—and even flourish—on the 
Internet. As The Straits Times columnist Tan Tarn How reported, no less than three 
“underground political Web sites,” most of which are not directly linked to opposition political 
parties, were set up in Singapore within the first nine months of 2003 alone (Tan 2003: 15). 
These include: The Optical (an information and newsgroup Web site), The Void Deck (a news 
and commentary site), and Singapore Review (an email-based news service provider). Other 
alternative Web sites that have continued to survive despite ongoing political pressures include: 
New Sintercom, Think Centre, Singapore Window, TalkingCock.com and Sammyboy. Although 
Tan (2003) criticizes the lack of analytical content and journalistic professionalism on most of 
these Web sites, he acknowledges their growing popularity and potential impact on the media 
and civil society when he notes that: “Some [commentaries and writings] are ludicrous, but many 
are also intelligent and serious, evidently not just the musings of bored undergraduate geeks with 
no social life but people who seem to know what they are talking about” (p. 15). 
It is important to realize that many of these alternative Web sites continue to exist for various 
reasons. Most claim to promote civil society in Singapore, though some are overtly politically-
  17motivated, while others appear to serve as conduits for candid socio-political discussions. 
Nevertheless, most editors or web protect themselves by operating under the cloak of anonymity, 
and many of these sites “inhabit a nebulous region of cyberspace without a fixed location” to 
avoid falling foul of Singapore laws (Tan 2001: 15). Indeed, none of the alternative sites 
referenced in this chapter have the geographical ‘sg’ suffix in their Internet addresses. Although 
it is technically possible for the authorities to track down the identities of operators of these sites 
and shut them down, such draconian measures are unlikely as they would damage the 
government’s technology-friendly reputation, and flout its promise to regulate the Internet with a 
‘light-touch.’  
While the authorities will continue to make it difficult for alternative Web sites to function, by 
maintaining a tensed climate of fear and by continuing to enact new laws, codes and guidelines 
or pass further amendments to existing laws, it is likely that the Internet will remain the prime 
site for democratic articulations and political communication in Singapore simply because it is 
by far the most malleable of communication mediums to date. The battle over the shape, form 
and place of the Internet for political communication in Singapore would thus continue to be 
fought in the foreseeable future.  
CONCLUSION 
As globalization and advancements in communication technologies take center-stage, political 
communication in Singapore will be inevitably reshaped by new ways of interacting. The entry 
of the Internet, new telecommunication devices and services such as video conferencing and 
wireless computing have given Singaporeans a much greater selection of communication options 
and the power to interact affordably and easily—despite often tight controls of the mass media. 
Coupled with the increase in literacy and education level (da Cunha 1997), the state of political 
communication in Singapore may be set to change as a growing number of young and educated 
people become more outspoken. In recent years, for example, there has been a more apparent 
debate on a range of political and social issues which have translated into an increase in the 
number of opposition votes during elections (Vasil 2004). Furthermore, as technological 
innovation and creativity become essential components of the future global economy, the 
Singapore government may be pressured to widen the margins of political participation and 
communication. 
  18It is important to remember, though, that technology on its own is of no strategic value in terms 
of expanding political participation as there are limited opportunities and commitment from the 
people to use and promote them for democratic purposes. Ironically, although Singapore has one 
of the highest penetration of Internet connectivity, mobile phones and other technologies 
(Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore 2005; Lee 2002; 2005), the public is generally 
uncomfortable about using it for political ends (Gomez 2002; Sussman 2003). As such, even if 
new modes of technology provides a panacea in altering the nation’s consensual and submissive 
political culture, its potential among the wider society would still be muted by deeply-entrenched 
political beliefs and a conservative value system (Ibrahim 2004; Kuo et al. 2002). 
However, the key question is whether the government can continue to ignore the growing vocal 
minority and adopt their heavily regulated stance on technology to secure its mandate to govern 
(da Cunha 1997). Perhaps the idealism and empathy of the political opposition may reshape the 
future of political communication in Singapore, as the educated elite might clamor for more 
spaces of political articulation and push for a greater degree of political empowerment.  
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